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RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0006  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5564  
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0423  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2914  
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0474  
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0201  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0774  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1378  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0803  
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0181  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5921  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0162  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1692  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7240  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC  
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003032

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHSA](#) [MARR](#) [PTER](#) [EWWT](#) [KPKO](#) [IN](#)

SUBJECT: INDIA CAREFULLY CONSIDERING ANTI-PIRACY PLANS,  
LOOKING FOR UN COVER AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

REF: A. DAO NEW DELHI - NAVCENT EMAIL 10/25/08 (NOTAL)

[1](#)B. STATE 102911

[1](#)C. NEW DELHI 2740

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary. While media reports begin to surface that the INS Tabar sunk a pirated fishing boat with hostages -- and not a pirate "mothership," as the Indian Navy had first claimed -- Indian officials are struggling to come up with a policy for Indian involvement in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Post has been consulting with the Indian Navy and External Affairs Ministry on what India is willing to do, however the GOI seems to be struggling to decide on the extent its involvement. External Affairs Ministry Joint Secretary (UN-Political) Bhattacharjee told PolCouns India is hoping for a UN Security Council Resolution that would provide political cover for India and other countries not interested in working under a U.S. or NATO command, combined with an international coordination center to allow the various groups to share data and collaborate on operations. The INS Tabar incident is likely to severely limit India's willingness to conduct operations, although contacts maintain that India will participate in an international effort. Post believes these anti-piracy operations offer an excellent opportunity for U.S.-India military cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and suggests the USG support Indian efforts to be involved. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (C) PolCouns called on Indian Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary (United Nations-Political) Asith Bhattacharjee on November 24 and followed up on November 28 to discuss possible greater U.S.-India coordination on anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. (Note: Ref A describes DAO New Delhi's discussions

with the Indian Navy on operational issues related to these efforts. End Note.) Bhattacharjee, a veteran of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, said India is indeed interested in a UN mandate to provide a political umbrella for countries, such as India, that wish to contribute but do not want to fall under U.S., EU or NATO command, nor be seen as taking orders from another country. Bhattacharjee said India seeks an arrangement similar to a peacekeeping operation, but not called a PKO, which he felt was politically charged. The mandate would need to be clear on the authorities granted to participants and the rules of engagement. India would seek to combine elements of Law of the Seas Articles 100 and 105 with Chapter VII of the UN Charter to allow for seizure and arrest, which according to Bhattacharjee provide "all the tools we need." Referring back to Ref B demarche on escorts for World Food Program ships entering Somalia, Bhattacharjee said the problem was now larger than just the Somali coast, and that a resolution broader than UNSCRs 1816 and 1838 was needed for the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa region.

13. (C) Bhattacharjee envisioned the UNSCR would also set up an "international coordination center" mechanism between those operating under the UN mandate and U.S., NATO or other forces operating under their own command. "It would not take command away from anyone," he maintained, but could serve as a force multiplier facilitating the sharing of data and real time collaboration on operations. Bhattacharjee speculated that should such a UN mandate be secured, other countries --

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he specifically cited Egypt -- would be motivated to join operations. He added that India did not want to be a "lone ranger" operating outside the U.S.-EU-NATO rubric in the region. He recounted that UN Security Council committees had been formed on many issues, such as the Somalia arms embargo, and suggested that this may be another such issue where the navies of several countries could be included with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) providing a coordinating role, or perhaps a IMO subcommittee established to give the grouping a UN stamp. Bhattacharjee spoke enthusiastically about this proposal, but did not explicitly say India would be willing to help lobby other UNSC members to pass a resolution for these operations. Bhattacharjee noted to PolCouns that the Indian Mission in New York had provided him with a quick readout of a U.S. draft resolution (sic), which he characterized as promising. In terms of India's participation, Bhattacharjee said that India "might offer assets, depending no the structure." He asked whether a there is a model that would include all the involved countries at the same table, as with the IMO.

14. (C) Comment. While all indications are that the Indian Navy is prepared to act when ordered, Indian policy makers and politicians have moved slowly to respond to the international community's call for greater engagement on this issue, and no doubt the INS Tabar incident will further restrain forward leaning by the External Affairs Ministry. Still, anti-piracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean offer an ideal opportunity for the U.S. and India to begin building on several aspects of the global partnership we are seeking, including military-to-military cooperation, maritime security (as called for in our Maritime Cooperation Framework), expanded information sharing, and greater cooperation in international fora such as the United Nations. Collaboration on these operations could also help fill lingering gaps in our defense cooperation, such as the lack of a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). Additionally, a successful campaign with India working comfortably under the UN umbrella but side-by-side with the U.S., NATO and others partners, could help break down biases against the U.S. which persist within the Indian bureaucracy and facilitate our collaboration on future operations, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Post is hopeful that we can help India find the political cover it

needs to work with us on these vital operations.

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